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This paper explores the relationship between growth and unemployment.
Knowledge formation is the source of growth, which includes the two dimen-
sions technologies and skills. Both are connected through a technology-skill
complementarity which may have limiting e⁄ects on the reallocation of labor
and technology implementation in manufacturing. The reallocation of labor
becomes necessary as growth leads to continuous job creation and job destruc-
tion. The ratio of job destruction to job creation identi￿es three regimes, two
of which are associated with unemployment either due to restricted labor de-
mand or due to skill shortages. While in the regime with full employment
the model con￿rms the standard result that knowledge formation has positive
e⁄ects on growth, the outcome is much more ambiguous if we consider a pos-
sible technology-skill mismatch and unemployment.
Keywords: endogenous growth, knowledge formation, unemployment, skill
mismatch
JEL-classi￿cation: E24, J63, O33
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1 Introduction
The general belief in economics is that knowledge formation has positive e⁄ects
on both growth and unemployment. It is argued that the expansion of knowledge
stimulates growth and manifests in a higher individual productivity and therefore
results in higher wages or a lower unemployment risk.1 In this paper we address
the question of whether knowledge still keeps its positive role if we jointly consider
growth and unemployment. Possible limitations come from the consideration of
a skill-technological complementarity and the unequal expansion of collective and
individual knowledge in the form of technologies and skills.
Several ideas have been o⁄ered to account for the impact of growth on employ-
ment and the other way around. The very early contributions by Harrod (1939)
and Domar (1946) analyzed the link under the assumption of a bounded factor
substitution. The more recent literature (see Aric￿, 2003, for an overview) focuses
on imperfections and frictions in the labor market such as search costs (Pissarides,
1990, and Aghion and Howitt, 1994), e¢ ciency wages (van Schaik and de Groot,
1998, and Meckl, 2001), and unions (Lingens, 2003). Another part of the literature
explores employment e⁄ects which arise from growth via technological change. King
and Welling (1995) and in particular Acemoglu (1997 and 1999) analyze technol-
ogy choices, skill supply and unemployment in search equilibrium. ‚ Sener (2000)
considers the case of innovation-based growth and skill-biased technological change,
in which unemployment of low-skilled workers results from the emergence of in-
novative technologies. The idea of this paper is to combine skill formation with
both elements of technological change: technological development by research and
technology implementation in manufacturing. Technology development and technol-
ogy implementation are interrelated and a shortage of skilled labor restricts both.
This implies that technological change and skill formation compose a twin-engine of
growth as it is formulated by Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts (2002).2 In addition to their
results, we show that skill shortages may lead not only to growth constraints but
also to involuntary unemployment.
The paper revisits the idea that technological change is accompanied by creative
1 See, for example, Grilliches (1997) for an overview, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), and Barro and
Lee (1993) for the knowledge-growth relationship, and OECD (1992 chap.2) for the link between
knowledge formation and employment.
2 In further related literature, Chari and Hopenhayn (1998) model technology-speci￿c human cap-
ital and analyze changes in technology di⁄usion with exogenous technological progress. Young
(1993) investigates how the speed of technology implementation depends on the degree of learning-
by-doing in the economy. Stokey (1991) assumes heterogeneous labor with a skill-technology
complementarity in order to study the link between education decisions and growth.3
destruction, which causes a continuous reallocation of labor between ￿rms that close
and those that newly enter the market (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). We add to this
that workers are heterogenous in respect of skills and that skill shortages are a
friction in the process of reallocating labor. The use of innovations, that is new
technologies, requires workers endowed with new skills. If technologies get updated
faster than skills upgrade, this leads to unemployment as ￿rms demand more skilled
labor than it is supplied but the opposite is true for non-skilled labor. This implies
that innovation-based growth is a misleading strategy to ￿ght unemployment as
joblessness results from skill shortages caused by too many innovations.
As we consider a negative feedback of unemployment on growth, we ￿nd mixed
results of how changes in knowledge formation a⁄ect growth. Knowledge formation
can be divided into the technology and the skill channel. Which one leads to more
growth depends on whether skill shortages result in a consequent decline in employ-
ment or not. While the model con￿rms the standard results of positive e⁄ects on
growth from improvements in knowledge formation if workers are fully employed,
the outcome is much more ambiguous if we assume skill shortages. For example,
we ￿nd that growth may drop as soon as resources are reallocated towards R&D,
which contrasts with the standard innovation models. In this case, a shift from
the development towards the implementation of technologies, for example through
subsidies to the technology using sector, provides superior results in terms of growth
and employment.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model with a de-
scription of the technology formation and the skill formation which leads to equilib-
rium labor allocation between the two sectors research and development (R&D) and
manufacturing. Furthermore, it is analyzed how labor reallocation with job creation
and job destruction can result in equilibrium unemployment. Section 3 discusses
the consequences of knowledge formation under the assumption of a technology-skill
complementarity, considering changes in employment and growth. Finally, Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The model considers the joint formation of technologies and skills and analyzes how
this a⁄ects the matching of labor demand and supply under the assumption of a
technology-skill complementarity. From this we will derive the consequences for
growth and employment. We construct a two-sector model with R&D and manufac-4
turing, in which growth is driven by innovations and may be restricted by a shortage
of skilled labor. Unemployment occurs as a symptom of this growth restriction.
We consider an economy populated by a mass L of in￿nite living individuals.
They are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically. Accord-
ingly, L is the total labor supply. All individuals share the same linear intertemporal
preferences. The expected utility ￿ of individual i is generated by consuming the






We discount future consumption at rate r which is the individual time preference
equal to the constant interest rate. Workers are either employed or unemployed
and they are paid only in the ￿rst case. Unemployment is stochastic but non-
permanent. In an economy with a frictionless credit market, workers can insure
themselves against unemployment in order to smooth out their consumption path.
Furthermore, labor income in the R&D sector is stochastic as well. This implies
that equation (1) measures expected instead of actual utility.3
The subsequent analysis is twofold. First, we develop the equilibrium labor allo-
cation between R&D and manufacturing. To do so, we set up the growth framework
which follows the literature on growth via endogenous technological progress based
on Aghion and Howitt (1992). Then, we introduce skill formation and the realloca-
tion of labor with job creation and job destruction. From this it follows how skill
shortages change equilibrium labor allocation and on which conditions unemploy-
ment occurs.
2.1 Technology Formation
We start the modeling of endogenous innovation under the assumption of homoge-
nous labor and full employment in the sectors R&D and manufacturing. In contrast
to this, the subsequent analysis in section 2.2 shows that unemployment can occur
if labor is heterogenous with regard to skills. The remainder of this section derives
3 The utility function which is linear in consumption implies that individuals are risk neutral con-
cerning investment decision in R&D. We follow here the Aghion and Howitt (1992) framework,
which is restrictive in this point because the choice of (1) includes that optimal household behavior
is neglected to a large extent. W￿lde (1999) shows that many of the market failures disappear,
which apply to the basic model, if risk averse households diversify their investment portfolio. How-
ever, the outcome of unemployment, the focus of this paper, is not subject to the formulation of
the utility function.5
the returns from the production of the ￿nal good in manufacturing and the inter-
mediate good in R&D respectively. We then establish the equilibrium intersectoral
labor allocation which excludes arbitrage in the expected income between R&D and
manufacturing. The equilibrium labor allocation ￿nally de￿nes the relative size of
the two sectors which, in turn, determines current output and the rate of growth.
2.1.1 Technological Progress
Technological progress is the only source of equilibrium growth. R&D forms new
technologies and shifts the frontier technology ￿max
t . When a research unit develops
an innovation this adds a new technology ￿ to the current number of available tech-
nologies in the interval [1;￿max
t ]. Hence, the span of the interval increases over time.
Technological progress evolves productivity gains and the embodied productivity
level A￿ increases with any subsequent technology by a factor ￿:
A￿ = ￿A￿￿1: (2)
The number of R&D units which undertake research is LR. Each unit has a Poisson-
distributed arrival rate " of being the next innovator. This implies that the pro-
ductivity parameter is expected to increase by a factor ￿
"LR during the time unit
t. Accordingly, technological progress gA;t shifts the productivity of the frontier
technology over time according to:
gA;t = "LR;t ln(￿): (3)
Technological progress is endogenous as the size of the R&D sector, LR, will result
from the equilibrium labor allocation between R&D and manufacturing. The equi-
librium is de￿ned as no-arbitrage between the expected income earned by the supply
of the ￿nal good and the intermediate good respectively. The alternative incomes
are de￿ned in the following two sections.
2.1.2 The Final Good Production
Firms in the manufacturing sector demand technologies and use them to produce
the homogenous ￿nal good in a set of di⁄erent vintages. The technology ￿ de￿nes
the vintage and, hence, ￿ denotes both the technology and the related vintage. As
technologies are di⁄erent, relative productivity a￿ = A￿=A￿max
t varies among the vin-
tages. Relative productivity is equal to unity in ￿max
t and lower in all other vintages.6
Once the R&D sector supplies a new technology, a new vintage ￿max
t in manufac-
turing is created. The new vintage chooses the current maximum technology but
no updating is possible afterwards. The ￿xed vintage technology implies a relative
productivity loss, namely a￿ declines, as soon as a new technology with a higher pro-
ductivity is implemented in manufacturing. Suppose furthermore that there exists a
maximum distance to the current maximum productivity A￿max
t which characterizes
the minimum relative productivity a￿min
t .4 Consequently, the gradual increase in
A￿max
t according to the move in ￿max
t leads to ￿nal technological obsolescence of vin-
tages below ￿min
t . Hence, although there is a wider range of available technologies,
only those with at least minimum productivity are used in manufacturing. While






, each vintage starts as ￿max at t and
ends as ￿min some periods after t. Accordingly, the manufacturing sector faces a
continuous structural change with the emergence and disappearance of vintages.
Two steps are necessary to manufacture the ￿nal good Y . First, labor transforms
an intermediate good into a useful input for production.5 The transformation of
the intermediate good follows a simple linear technology in which one employee
transforms a fraction 1=￿ of one unit of the intermediate good x￿. This connects
the two inputs in manufacturing simply as follows:
LM;￿ = ￿x￿: (4)
In the second step, the ￿nal good is created from the intermediate goods at a de-
creasing rate of return ￿ and at a productivity level A￿. Furthermore, we assume
that some of the output is needed to cover overhead costs6 ￿￿, which are constant in








Only vintages which ful￿ll A￿ ￿ a￿min





t Y￿ as they have a productivity level which represents a technology
above ￿min
t .
4 We come back to this technology limitation in section 2.2 when we specify the reallocation of labor,
which becomes necessary due to the technological obsolescence of vintages and the disappearance
of the ￿rms which have a technology below ￿min.
5 Such as software is only bene￿cial with the corresponding user.
6 With overhead costs it is not possible to reduce inputs to an in￿nitesimal number to maintain
production. Instead, a market exit occurs as soon as revenues are lower than overhead costs.7
The demand for the intermediate good and labor are the result of pro￿t maxi-
mization in manufacturing. As long as a vintage exists it earns a ￿ ow of pro￿ts ￿M;￿.
The costs of one unit of the intermediate good are composed of the corresponding
price p￿ paid to the intermediate good supplier and, in addition to this, the com-
plementary labor costs as a factor ￿ of the wage rate w￿. Revenues, which follow
from the production function, face these production costs, and the consequent pro￿t
equation is as follows:
￿M;￿ = A￿x
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (p￿ + ￿w￿)x￿: (6)





















How much of the intermediate good and of labor is demanded, varies with relative
productivity. Highly productive technologies imply c.p. a high demand for the
inputs.
Wages are set subject to average productivity in manufacturing. In contrast to
the technology di⁄erences, labor is homogenous and we therefore assume that all
manufacturing workers obtain the same wage w￿. The wage rate is ￿xed in such
a way that the wage equals a share ￿ of the revenues of vintage e ￿ which has the
average relative productivity e a. This yields:







Average relative productivity and labor input are constant. Therefore, wages in-
crease over time with A￿max
t at the rate gA: Higher employment leads to higher
revenues and increases the wage rate. Taking account of the decrease of labor de-
mand with the wage rate, we can conclude that an equilibrium exists with the
corresponding equilibrium wage rate and employment. It is necessary to generate
pro￿ts, at least with the minimum employment of one worker, which restricts the8
share of revenues which might go to the workers to ￿ < 1 ￿
￿




Higher wages due to a higher ￿ would not leave enough revenues to cover the costs
for the intermediate good and the overhead costs.
While manufacturing workers earn a wage rate w￿, the manufacturing ￿rms
have zero pro￿ts over lifetime. Market entry with the emergence of a new vintage is
associated with the implementation of the current leading technology. Suppose that
this is accompanied by the payment of ￿xed costs of F￿. The manufacturing sector is
competitive so that the ￿ ow of pro￿ts over life time only covers implementation costs.
De￿ne ￿ t as the moment of market entry and let T denote the point in time when the
￿rm closes. Then the zero-pro￿t condition implies that
Z t=T
t=￿ t
e￿r(t￿￿ t)￿M;￿;tdt = F￿.
2.1.3 R&D and the Intermediate Good Production
R&D units produce the intermediate good and develop innovations as superior tech-
nologies, which provide the intermediate good with a higher productivity level A￿.
Various R&D units compete in the development of the next innovation. As soon
as an innovator appears with a new maximum technology ￿max
t , the corresponding
R&D unit sells the innovation in form of intermediate goods to the manufacturing
sector. The ￿ ow of pro￿ts, earned from selling the intermediate good, determines
the value of an innovation. This value then yields the return to labor of an R&D
unit, which is the alternative income to the wage rate in manufacturing.
The R&D units produce the intermediate good at c￿ = cA￿ constant marginal
costs, which are proportional to the technology level. As soon as an innovation arises
the previous technology becomes common knowledge and di⁄erent ￿rms compete in
the supply of the intermediate good so that they set price equal to marginal costs
c￿. Hence, no pro￿ts arise for these intermediate good suppliers.
However, only the innovator has the knowledge about the leading technology
￿max
t . Hence, there is no competition in the supply of technology ￿max
t and its
supplier earns monopolistic pro￿ts. The innovator replaces the previous monopoly
and then sets the pro￿t-maximizing price and output. Pro￿ts of the R&D unit










The monopoly chooses the pro￿t-maximizing quantity of output and sets the
corresponding p￿max
t . The R&D unit faces the inverse demand function of the man-9
ufacturing vintage ￿max






t ￿ ￿w￿: (11)
With this expression for p￿max
t , the ￿rst-order condition of the maximization program
max￿R;￿max










where !￿ = w￿=A￿ denotes the productivity-adjusted wage. The corresponding price













The monopolist takes a mark-up to marginal costs which is twofold. First, 1=￿
represents the usual mark-up according to the price elasticity of demand. The
second term represents the fact that labor and the intermediate good are used in
a ￿xed ratio. High wages reduce the demand for the intermediate good. However,
according to the inverse demand function, a small quantity of output corresponds
to a high price.
Price and output determine how much the R&D unit earns as long as it can
realize the monopolistic pro￿ts. However, the value of an innovation is less than
the in￿nite ￿ ow of pro￿ts. Competitors undertake R&D and will therefore replace
the incumbent at some stage. This means that the ￿ ow of pro￿ts immediately stops
as soon as the next innovation has been developed. This emerges stochastically at
probability " per labor unit in a number of LR R&D units which employ one worker
each. Thus, the expected present value V￿ of an innovation takes account of the ￿ ow
of pro￿ts and the probability of a total loss of the asset value. This leads to the
following asset equation
rV￿ = ￿R;￿ ￿ "LRV￿; (14)
which implies that the investment in R&D must bring the same expected returns as
the investment in an alternative asset whose return is the constant interest rate r.
Rearranging the asset equation, together with the pro￿t equation (10) and the values10
p￿max
t and x￿max













Competition in form of a high "LR;￿ lowers the value of an innovation as the expected
time span is short, in which monopolistic pro￿ts arise. Moreover, the value of an
innovation is a function of time as it depends on the technology level A￿max
t which
increases over time. From this it follows that V￿ increases proportional to A￿max
t at
the rate of technological progress.
2.1.4 Equilibrium Intersectoral Labor Allocation
Labor can be employed either in manufacturing or in R&D and workers are free
to move from one to the other. Moves stop in equilibrium when both alternatives
o⁄er the same expected income. This income identity then yields the equilibrium
intersectoral labor allocation.
While manufacturing workers earn the wage w￿, research workers receive no
income unless their ￿rm innovates. Innovation is stochastic and research workers
get an expected income of "V￿+1 as a worker develops the next innovation ￿ + 1 at
the probability ". As long as the income identity
w￿ = "V￿+1 (16)
holds, no sector attracts workers with the prospect of a higher income.
The income identity can be written also as an expression of the parameters of
the model and the relative labor shares of the two sectors. This ￿nally determines
the equilibrium intersectoral labor allocation. We substitute V￿+1 as it arises in
the income identity (16) by the value of the innovation according to (15), but with
the future technology ￿ + 1 instead of the current one ￿. Solving for LR then
gives us the size of the R&D sector LR = x￿max








(r="). The input of the intermediate good can be replaced by labor, as x￿max
t =
LM;￿max
t =￿. One can ￿nally show that the ratio of labor input in vintage ￿max
t to the
remaining employment in manufacturing is a constant 1=￿ (see appendix), which
yields LM;￿max
t = LM=[￿ + 1]. Therefore, x￿max
t is equal to LM=[￿(1 + ￿)] and we
can then write the income identity as:
AE: LR = LM
￿














AE is the no-arbitrage equation, in which the equilibrium employment shares of
R&D and manufacturing even out the income alternatives. Deviations from AE
lead to adjustments in the income levels. To see this, suppose that LR is higher and
LM is lower than no-arbitrage according to AE implies. In this case the competition
in R&D is particularly high and reduces the value of an innovation. Furthermore,
the demand for intermediate goods is low because the complementary labor input in
manufacturing is low. The consequently reduced pro￿ts from selling the intermediate
good additionally reduce the value of an innovation. Accordingly, workers would
move towards the manufacturing sector as it o⁄ers a higher income than R&D. This
reduces LR and increases LM. The process continues until the income di⁄erences
disappear and the employment ratio corresponds to the one which follows from AE.
If the adjustments takes place immediately, as it is assumed in this type of models7,
the economy jumps to its equilibrium and remains there afterwards.
The actual size of LR and LM follows from the magnitude of the total labor
supply L. The labor market identity L = LM + LR implies that labor is fully
















The equilibrium number of researcher follows straightforward from subtracting (18)
from L. Parameters which tend to increase the expected pro￿ts from innovation,
such as the size of innovations ￿ and the innovation probability ", lead to a higher
share of labor in R&D and less employment in manufacturing. Since R&D is the
engine of growth, economies with a comparable high share of labor in R&D grow
faster.
2.2 Labor Reallocation and the Skill Shortage
Technology formation, as it is modeled in the previous section, causes a turnover
of vintages and a reallocation of labor which results from continuous job creation
and job destruction. As soon as an innovator creates a new leading technology this
introduces a new vintage in manufacturing which generates new labor demand. In
contrast to this, all other vintages experience a decline in their relative productivity
7 We refer here to the standard growth models with endogenous innovation in the tradition of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).12
and, hence, they reduce their labor demand. This process has not been analyzed
explicitly so far as we assumed that the reallocation of labor from old vintages to
the new one is frictionless. We change this assumption in the following analysis
and assume instead that only skilled labor is able to match8 labor demand in the
technologically leading vintage. These skills are formed in a process of learning-
by-using in the manufacturing sector. In case of skill shortages, the reallocation of
labor causes unemployment as this scenario leads to a job destruction which exceeds
job creation.
2.2.1 Technology Obsolescence and Job Destruction
Technological progress creates new vintages in manufacturing and results in the
disappearance of old ones. Between their emergence and their disappearance, vin-
tages face a gradual technological obsolescence until they ￿nally fall below a mini-
mum technological level. Technological obsolescence leads also to job destruction in
the corresponding vintages as older vintages are less productive and labor demand
declines with a fall in relative productivity. Furthermore, the labor demand gets
zero with the ￿nal technological obsolescence.
A minimum level of relative productivity characterizes the ￿nal technological ob-
solescence. Remember that each vintage represents a particular productivity level
A￿. The range of vintages is between ￿min
t and ￿max
t , which have di⁄erent produc-





t = 1. The minimum level A￿min
t is de￿ned as the one that corre-
sponds to revenues which yield zero pro￿ts, i.e. ￿M;￿ = 0. In other words, vintages
with a level above A￿min
t generate pro￿ts which are used to cover implementation
costs, but no vintage produces with a level below A￿min
t as it would imply selling the
￿nal good at a loss. The pro￿ts of manufacturing are revenues A￿x￿
￿;t minus over-
head costs ￿￿ and variable costs (c￿ + ￿w￿)x￿;t. Variable costs consist of the price
of the intermediate good, equal to its marginal costs of production (p￿ = c￿), and
complementary wage costs. We then ￿nd that zero pro￿ts correspond to a minimum
8 With respect to the link between innovation and the matching of jobs and workers, the model is
related to the analysis by Aghion and Howitt (1994). However, the introduction of the technology-














Revenues are constant but we de￿ned wages in such a way that they increase at the
rate of technological progress over time. This means that revenues exceed costs in
the beginning but pro￿ts decline with the subsequent rise in labor costs. Therefore,
there is a maximum wage wmax
￿ a vintage with technology A￿ is able to pay and
















Production is given up as soon as productivity is below the minimum level which
can be interpreted as the ￿nal technological obsolescence. Before this happens, each
emergence of an innovation increases the wage rate and lowers pro￿ts so that the
technology gradually approaches its ￿nal obsolescence. Let ￿ denote the number
of innovations after which the vintage disappears. Suppose that vintage ￿ started
with a technology adjusted wage rate ￿ ! = w￿;t=A￿; then the maximum wage is given
by wmax
￿ =A￿ = ￿ !e￿￿. (Remember that each new technology raises the maximum
productivity, and consequently wages, by a factor ￿.) This yields that the span of








￿ ln ￿ !
￿
: (21)
The rate of technological obsolescence is high if the technology span ￿ is small.
In this case only few innovations are enough until relative productivity reaches its
minimum level.
The degree of vintage obsolescence is one measure of job destruction. As soon as
a new ￿max
t arises, the vintage with the lowest productivity ￿min
t disappears and cuts
all prior labor demand. Recall from the description of the manufacturing sector
that labor demand according to (8) is LM;￿ = ￿
￿
￿a￿A￿max
t =(c￿;t + ￿w￿;t)
￿1=(1￿￿).
9 A￿min
t would be zero without overhead costs. However, the elimination of the threshold technology
implies an in￿nite lifetime of vintages and excludes the ￿nal technological obsolescence.14
The wage of ￿min
t is equal to wmax











workers. The subsequent technological obsolescence stops production in that vintage
and causes job destruction whose extent is equal to LM;￿min
t . One can see that a high
rate of technological obsolescence in terms of a small ￿ results in job destruction of
large extent. Vintages disappear with a comparable high productivity, and which,
therefore, still had a considerable employment share.
It is not only the disappearance of ￿min
t which causes job destruction but other
vintages reduce labor input at the same time. Innovations increase A￿max
t but this
means that relative productivity declines in all other vintages. We can see from the
equation of LM;￿ that labor demand is a function of relative productivity. Only a
share of the workers smaller than one remains employed in vintage ￿ as soon as the
next innovation reduces relative productivity from a￿ to a￿=￿. Let ￿ denote the
ratio of employment before to employment after the innovation. Then divide the
expression for reduced labor demand LM;￿(￿￿=￿) by LM;￿(a￿) to obtain the share of








Consequently, as soon as the next innovation emerges, a share 1 ￿ ￿ of the current
number of manufacturing workers lose their jobs due to a gradual technological
obsolescence.
The total extent of job destruction is the result of the gradual and the ￿nal
technological obsolescence. Final technological obsolescence destroys LM;￿min
t jobs.
Furthermore, a share 1 ￿ ￿ of the current jobs in manufacturing disappears. The
number of current employments in manufacturing yields from total labor supply
minus unemployed minus workers in the R&D sector. With u as the unemployment
rate this is LM = (1 ￿ ut)L ￿ LR. Finally, innovations emerge at the probability









2.2.2 Job Creation and Skill formation
The emergence of a new vintage in the manufacturing sector creates new jobs. How-
ever, the new jobs relate to the innovative technology and we therefore assume that
the employees must be skilled to match the new jobs.10 This assumption causes
frictions in the process of reallocating labor from obsolete vintages to the new one.
The new vintage ￿max
t arises in manufacturing as soon as the corresponding in-
novative technology is developed. This vintage aims to employ workers in order to
start production. Therefore it opens vacancies and, thereby, generates new labor
demand. How many vacancies are created follows from the input demand and mo-
nopolistic pro￿t-maximization speci￿ed in the description of the intermediate good
production. The supply of the intermediate good which embodies the technology
update has been shown in (12). Labor demand is a fraction ￿ of this number.









This number is equal to job creation if the all vacancies can be ￿lled. However, some
vacancies remain un￿lled if labor demand does not face an equal supply of skilled
labor. So skill shortages can be a restriction to job creation.
We de￿ne skills as the ability to use the highest technological standard in manu-
facturing. Skills are formed in a stochastic process of learning-by-using in manufac-
turing ￿rms. The probability that workers get skilled is higher in the technologically
leading vintage than in the other ones. Those workers who are employed in ￿max
t
have a probability of ￿ < 1 to acquire skills and therefore to be enabled to ￿ll a
vacancy in the vintage which follows next. Suppose that other workers have also
the chance to get skilled but at lower probability ￿￿ with (￿ < 1) as they do not
use the current leading technology. The share of manufacturing workers employed
in ￿max
t is 1=(1 + ￿). This yields that ￿LM=(1 + ￿) workers can expect to obtain
skill updates when they work in ￿max
t and ￿￿LM=[1 ￿ 1=(1 + ￿)] in the remaining








Skill formation obviously increases with the e¢ ciency of learning-by-using, namely
10Hollanders and ter Weel (2002) provide empirical evidence for the necessary skill upgrade with the
introduction of new technologies..16
￿ and ￿. Moreover, the labor share of the leading vintage, 1=(1 + ￿), has also a
positive impact on skill formation as the e¢ ciency of learning about technologies is
highest in high-technology ￿rms.
Job creation is unrestricted if LM;￿max
t > D and limited through the skill shortages
otherwise. Hence, job creation is the minimum of either the number of vacancies or
the supply of skilled labor. A constant share of workers get skilled in manufacturing.
However, in absolute numbers the supply of skilled labor increases with the scale
of the manufacturing sector. Hence, the labor allocation between the sectors has
an e⁄ect on whether skill shortages restrict job creation or not. The next section
combines job creation with job destruction and shows how a mismatch between the
two results in unemployment.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Labor Allocation with Unemployment
The reallocation of labor with job creation and job destruction characterizes the
labor market. The labor ￿ ows generated by the reallocation are into and out of em-
ployment and must be equal in equilibrium. As the size of R&D and manufacturing
in terms of sectoral employment LR and LM a⁄ect the extent of job destruction and
job creation, see (24) and (26), we must ￿nd an equilibrium intersectoral labor allo-
cation which evens out di⁄erences in the job creation and job destruction. Possibly,
the balance between the two ￿ ows is accompanied by unemployment.
The continuous reallocation of labor arises between the vintages and between
unemployed and the non-leading vintages. Workers dismissed from employment
in manufacturing are excluded from entering the R&D sector. Furthermore, as
unemployed cannot become skilled, they lack the abilities to match jobs in the
newly created vintages. However, skilled workers from other vintages will ￿ll the
vacancies. The jobs left by the upgraded workers can then be ￿lled with non-skilled
unemployed. Hence, the minimum of either vacancies or the supply of skilled workers
yields the job creation for the non-skilled even if new jobs are created only for skilled
workers.
The di⁄erent possibilities to relate job creation to job destruction result in three
regimes, two of which produce unemployment. Recall for the following analysis job
destruction U+ according (24), job creation in form of fully ￿lled vacancies LM;￿max
t
according to (25), and job creation with skill shortages D according to (26). Each
of them may be the limitation to the reallocation of labor. Depending on whether
the value of U+; LM;￿max
t or D is the smallest, we obtain a regime with perfect labor
reallocation, restricted labor demand, or restricted skill formation.17
(I) Perfect labor reallocation: U+ju=0 ￿ LM;￿max
t ;D
In this regime job destruction is in any case lower than job creation in terms of
its two indicators LM;￿max
t and D. Job destruction is at its maximum if all work-
ers in the labor force are in jobs, denoted with U+ju=0. This is because dismissals
due to the gradual technological obsolescence a⁄ect a ￿xed proportion of the em-
ployment in manufacturing which is maximum in case of full employment. From
reversal conclusion follows that full employment is guaranteed only if job creation
can compensate for the maximum extent of job destruction, U+ju=0. We do not
consider other frictions in the job-worker matching, such as time consuming search
of job seekers. Accordingly, if U+ju=0 is small enough, the number of destroyed jobs
faces an equal number of new vacancies and dismissed workers immediately re-enter
new jobs. No unemployment occurs and job creation is restricted by the labor sup-
ply generated through job destruction. The ratio of LM;￿max
t to D has no e⁄ect on
employment but on the labor allocation between the sectors. Skill formation does
not cause any limits to innovation if the labor supply of skilled workers exceeds the
number of vacancies, namely D > LM;￿max
t . In this case, the equilibrium corresponds
to the one described in section 2.1.4.11
(II) Restricted labor demand: LM;￿max
t < U+ju=0 ;D
In this regime job creation in the form of new labor demand, corresponding to the
vacancies o⁄ered by the new vintage in manufacturing, is lower than the supply
of skilled labor and lower than maximum job destruction12 of U+ju=0. Hence, this
scenario is incompatible with full employment as in this case job destruction would
exceed job creation. Due to a relative lack of vacancies, job creation can be equal to
job destruction only if it is lower than maximum. As job destruction is proportional
to employment, set U+ = LM;￿max
t to see that equilibrium ￿ ows of job destruction
and job creation correspond to the occurrence of unemployment










11However, some vacancies in the leading vintage remain un￿lled if D < LM;￿max
t , which restricts the
implementation of technologies in manufacturing. Otherwise, skilled labor is partly employed in
non-leading vintages if D > LM;￿max
t . There is no e⁄ect on employment, but growth is restricted
in the ￿rst case because the leading technology is not fully exploited.
12In this and the next regime only the ratio of job destruction to the actual job creation, i.e. the
minimum of either D or LM;￿max
t , has a crucial impact on unemployment. Whether the alternative
parameter of job creation is larger than U+ju=0 ; or the other way around, is insigni￿cant in this
respect.18
High rates of labor reallocation in terms of 1￿￿ and ￿x￿min
t and a high innovation rate
in terms of "LR indicate high job destruction. A small share of workers in the leading
manufacturing vintage LM=[1 + ￿] is a sign of little job creation. Both high job
destruction and low job creation increase the extent of equilibrium unemployment.
(III) Restricted skill formation: D < U+ju=0 ;LM;￿max
t
Finally, in this regime skill shortages restrict job creation which consequently is
lower than the number of vacancies and lower than maximum job destruction of
U+ju=0. Again, unemployment evens out job creation and job destruction because
the ￿ ow into unemployment is lower in absolute numbers if the employment base is
reduced. We set U+ = D and solve for the number of unemployed, which yields:















As before, extensive labor reallocation and a high innovation rate are indicators for
a high job destruction which tends to increase unemployment. However, now job
creation is low, and unemployment high, in case of unproductive skill formation in
terms of low probabilities of acquiring skills, ￿ and ￿, and a small proportion of
workers in the leading vintage which imparts skills in the most e¢ cient way.
Which of the three regimes occurs depends on the parameter values and the
consequent ratios:
D T LM;￿max
t if ￿ T 1
￿￿+1










t T U+ju=0 if 1
1+￿ T "LR
￿






It can be seen from the corresponding equations that, for example, a low innovation
probability " implies low job destruction which may result in regime (I). Another
example would be that a high ratio of wages to productivity, !; reduces new labor
demand from the technologically leading vintage.13 Consequently, with higher wages
fewer vacancies are open and low job creation may result in regime (II). Regime
(III) occurs, for example, if skill formation is of small scale because learning rates
13The e⁄ect of ! becomes apparent if you substitute the expression for vacancies LM=(1 + ￿) with
(25). The new labor demand is low if ! is high.19
according to ￿ and ￿ are low.
All three regimes produce a balance between job creation and job destruction,
but in the regimes (II) and (III) the equilibrium is accompanied by unemployment.
The corresponding equations (27) and (28) show that unemployment is subject to the
employment ratio between R&D and manufacturing, LM=LR. Remember that this
ratio has already been derived as the ￿rst condition for the equilibrium intersectoral
labor allocation where no-arbitrage between R&D and manufacturing resulted in
the AE equation. However, skill shortages have an e⁄ect on the income identity
which underlies AE. Hence, to ￿nd the equilibrium allocation of labor with skill
shortages and unemployment, it is necessary to perform the following two steps:
We ￿rst derive the alternative no-arbitrage equation taking account of restricted job
creation, and we then add to this the equations for the equilibrium reallocation of
labor.
Skill shortages have e⁄ects not only on employment in manufacturing but on the
innovation intensity as well. Research ￿rms are forward-looking and form expec-
tations on their future returns. These returns are lower in case of skill shortages.
The link between the innovation intensity and the skill shortages is the size of man-
ufacturing in terms of sectoral employment. Some vacancies remain un￿lled and
employment in the technologically leading vintage in manufacturing sector is re-
stricted according to D < LM;￿max
t because only skilled labor is employable. As a
consequence of the ￿xed input ratio ￿ between labor and the intermediate good,
the R&D innovator sells less of the intermediate good to the manufacturing sec-
tor. With skill shortages, the actual market size for an innovator is D=￿ instead
of LM;￿max
t =￿. This implies that the amount produced deviates negatively from
the pro￿t-maximizing output of the monopolistic R&D innovator. The condition of
equal income opportunities in both sectors becomes unbalanced due to the reduction
in expected pro￿ts from performing research. The repeated exercise from section
2.1, which is the derivation of the no-arbitrage equation with equality between the
wage rate and the expected value of an innovation, yields the alternative AE equa-
tion with restricted innovation intensity. Hence, the AE equation is divided in two,






































" if D < LM;￿max
t :
(29)20
The ￿rst equation repeats AE of section 2.1. The second equation identi￿es those
employment shares of R&D and manufacturing which result in the income identity
between the sectors in case of skill shortages. The ￿rst equation corresponds to
regime (II) and the second equation to (III), whereas regime (I) can be assigned to
both. Restrictions in the innovation intensity due to skill shortages lead to lower in-
come from R&D. Therefore, the R&D sector attracts a smaller share of the working
force if D < LM;￿max
t relative to the case with unbounded demand for the interme-
diate good.
In addition to no-arbitrage, equilibrium allocation of labor demands even ￿ ows
into and out of unemployment. To formulate this condition we consider the labor
market identity with unemployment, L = LR + LM + utL, and use the right hand






















if D < LM;￿max
t :
(30)
These are the employment equations EE showing those employment shares of R&D
and manufacturing which yield the identity between job creation and job destruction.
The ￿rst equation represents regime (II) with vacancies as the restriction, while the
second equation corresponds to regime (III) and the case of skill shortages. As
there is no unemployment EE can be omitted in regime (I). Job destruction exceeds
job creation as soon as LR is above the value that EE implies for a given LM.
Unemployment would increase as a consequence. The argument is the other way
around, and unemployment decreases, if LR is below the corresponding equilibrium
value.
In the two regimes with unemployment, the equilibrium size of the two sectors
follows from no-arbitrage according to AE, as in the case with perfect reallocation of
labor, but additionally taking account of EE. Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration
of the equilibrium in the (LM;LR)-space. The properties of the equations are the
same for the alternative formulations of AE and EE. The locus of AE starts right
from the origin14 and slopes upwards. This indicates in both alternative settings
14R&D does not occur until a minimum number of workers are employed in manufacturing. This
property can be attributed to the necessity of a minimum demand for new products in order
to set costly research. This familiar outcome of innovation models is discussed, for example, by
Garcia-Castrillo and Sanso (2002).21
that a manufacturing sector of large scale increases the returns from innovations
in R&D because of a broad market for the intermediate good. High pro￿ts then
attract more R&D units. Consequently, LR increases with LM. The locus of EE is
strictly concave (see Appendix) and may correspond to either regime (II) or (III).
If vacancies are the restriction as in regime (II), the upward slope indicates that job
destruction, which corresponds to LR, can be higher in equilibrium in case of high
job creation which then is as a certain fraction of LM. Skill shortages restrict the
innovation intensity in regime (III). Hence, in this case the upward slope of AE is
the sign of the positive relativity of technology formation to skill formation, which
take place in R&D and manufacturing respectively. The intersection of the loci AE
and EE establish equilibrium labor allocation with unemployment, from which we
obtain the size of LM and LR. The intersection of the two curves may be right or
left from the labor market line with full employment L = LR+LM. The intersection
is right from the labor market line (point A) if there are no e⁄ects of skill supply on
employment. However, this point is located outwards of the employment space and
is therefore not attainable. Point B will be realized instead. This represents the case
without frictions in regime (I) equal to the result in section 2.1.4. However, labor
supply is not fully engaged if EE intersects with AE left from the labor market line,
such as in C. The distance between point C and the labor market line yields the
dimension of unemployment. Less labor is employed in both sectors in comparison
to point B. This implies less output and a lower growth path because the innovation
rate gA = "LR ln(￿) reduces with a low LR.
Some short considerations show the stability of the equilibrium. Firstly, the AE
locus is stable. The space above the line corresponds to a relative disadvantage
in income from R&D. The consequent movement towards manufacturing causes a
downward adjustment of LR and the employment combination approaches the AE
locus. Suppose furthermore that we start in a point above the EE curve. In this
case job destruction exceeds job creation and unemployment increases. This means
an adjustment downward and to the left, for example along AE from B to C. From
the two stable loci follows that any equilibrium labor allocation, such as point A,












Figure 1: Equilibrium labor allocation
3 Consequences of Knowledge Formation
Early endogenous growth models (for example, Romer, 1990, Grossman and Help-
man, 1991, and Aghion and Howitt, 1992) can be interpreted in the way that it
should be a policy concern to support private innovation e⁄orts. This is a result of
the properties of the growth equation, which is linear in the scale of inputs to R&D.
Hence, any policy that reallocates employment towards R&D also increases total
growth. The subsequent literature formulated some doubts on this. Based on Jones
(1995a, 1995b), non-scale growth models eliminate the scale e⁄ect of R&D through
the introduction of a counteracting factor such as increasing di¢ culties in research
over time (see Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998, for an overview). Others, as Young
(1993) and Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts (2002), formulate limits to R&D from the ne-
cessity of a parallel development of another dimension of knowledge, such as skills.15
The model presented here is in line with this part of the literature. However, a scale
e⁄ect of the labor force enters the model through the fact that more innovators
in a large economy lead to more job destruction, an indicator for unemployment.
On the other hand, the scale e⁄ect on growth disappears in case of skill shortages
15The literature, which criticizes the so-called scale e⁄ect apparent in the ￿rst innovation models,
includes models which produce policy invariance. An example would be Arnold (1998), who takes
R&D and human capital accumulation as substitutes. Consequently, subsidies to R&D reduce the
accumulation of human capital and vice versa.23
because AE and EE determine not only the labor allocation but, additionally, total
employment and growth as they ￿x the size of the R&D sector.
The model considers a technology-skill complementarity16 in the form that it is
necessary to employ skilled labor in order to implement innovative technologies in
manufacturing. From this it follows that a partial policy focus on R&D will not be
fully bene￿cial as long as skills are insu¢ ciently considered. The three regimes, with
their di⁄erent ratios between job destruction, vacancies, and skill supply, include a
variety of e⁄ects of knowledge formation on growth and employment. However, we
focus here on the two most di⁄erentiated cases of the regimes (I) and (III): Perfect
reallocation of labor with an abundance of skilled labor, and unemployment due
to skill shortages. Knowledge formation can take the channels skill upgrades and
technology updates. Exogenous variations may change the intensity of knowledge
formation, for example if a government intends to positively in￿ uence growth via a
set of policy measures. We discuss the examples subsidies to the R&D sector, sub-
sidies to the technologically leading vintage in manufacturing, and the exogenous
increase in the e¢ ciency parameters of R&D and learning-by-using. See Table 1 for
a summary of the results and the underlying shifts in AE and EE.
Raising the Poisson rate of knowledge formation
Knowledge formation in terms of technologies and skills has been modeled as a sto-
chastic process. It might be the case that the Poisson parameters of innovation,
"; and skill formation, ￿ and ￿, change over time (for example because the gen-
eral level of education increases, which improves the productivity of research and
training). Raising the Poisson rates means in the case of " that innovations arise at
shorter intervals. In the case of ￿and ￿ it implies that more workers acquire skills.
Equilibrium labor allocation reacts to these changes.
Considering AE, we ￿nd that the increase in " implies more researchers because
the time shortens in which research is in vain and produces no revenues. This e⁄ect
raises the expected pro￿ts and consequently R&D output and growth increase in
regime (I). However, in case of skill shortages the high attractiveness of R&D faces a
limit to technology implementation in manufacturing. The relative gain of the R&D
sector raises job destruction and results in more unemployment in regime (III).
16According to Goldin and Katz (1998) the technology-skill complementarity emerged early in the
twentieth century as new technologies, such as the assembly line, made pure physical labor input
less valuable. Empirical evidence for the technology-skill complementarity in the recent past is
given, for example, by Machin and van Reenen (1998), who ￿nd a signi￿cant link between skill
upgrading and R&D intensity in seven OECD countries between 1973 and 1989.24
Skill formation diminishes with the decline in employment and restricts further job
creation. Growth may increase or decrease on these conditions because two opposing
e⁄ects arise: Fewer researchers perform R&D, but each researcher develops more
innovations within a certain period.
Improvements in the skill formation, namely a higher ￿ or ￿, initially reduce skill
shortages in scenario (III), but they have only ambiguous e⁄ects on employment and
growth. The extra supply of skilled labor means that less limitation to job creation
leaves fewer vacancies un￿lled. The consequent increase in employment in the high-
tech manufacturing raises the revenues of R&D ￿rms from selling technologies to the
manufacturing sector. Hence, the R&D sector attracts a higher share of the labor
force. This, in turn, tends to increase job destruction. As a result, job creation
and job destruction increase at the same time. This yields that the total e⁄ect on
unemployment and growth is ambiguous and depends on which change is bigger. In
contrast to this, it is obvious that the extension of the skill supply has no e⁄ect on
employment and growth if skilled labor is not in short supply, such as in regime (I).
In this case the abundance of skills increases further, and skilled workers are more
frequently employed in the part of manufacturing which uses only prior technologies.
R&D subsidies
Subsidies to R&D could be used as an instrument of innovation policy which aims
to promote growth. Hence, we assume here that the government pays an amount ￿
to all R&D units as long as they perform research. Suppose furthermore that the
subsidies are ￿nanced through raising a lump-sum tax ￿ paid by the entire labor force
so that no distortions occur. From this it follows that each R&D unit gets an extra
income of ￿ ￿ ￿. No-arbitrage between the sectors, which is the ￿rst equilibrium
condition, demands the identity between expected incomes in manufacturing and
R&D. According to the identity in (16), wages w￿ must be equal to the value of the
next innovation V￿+1; weighted at the Poisson arrival rate ". The extra bene￿ts due
to the subsidies change this condition to w￿ ￿￿ = "V￿+1 +(￿ ￿￿). The consequent




































" if D < LM;￿max
t :
(31)25
In both equations subsidies lead to an relative increase in the R&D employment.
This is the result of the extra income which attracts a higher share of the labor force
to R&D.
As regards growth, subsidies to R&D yield mixed results depending on the re-
sponse of employment. There is no direct impact of subsidies on job creation or job
destruction so that EE remains unchanged. However, via changes in labor allocation
according to AE· subsidies have indirect e⁄ects on job creation and job destruc-
tion. The allocation e⁄ect of subsidies tends to increase the number of researchers
in regime (I) and the subsequent rise in innovations leads to more future growth.
However, in regime (III) the e⁄ect of more innovations and less manufacturing is a
further increase in the current skill shortages, with a rise in job destruction and a
reduction in job creation. The consequent decline in employment produces negative
e⁄ects on growth. An extension of technology formation can be realized only at
the expense of a reduction in skill formation. Hence, we ￿nd that, in case of skill
shortages, the result of subsidies to R&D is counterproductive. Fewer instead of
more innovations are developed because manufacturing ￿rms succeed less in tech-
nology implementation and the demand for technology updates drops. The e⁄ect of
subsidies is that R&D expands in relative terms but it decreases in absolute ones.
Subsidies to the technologically leading manufacturing vintage
An alternative strategy of innovation policy might be to subsidize the use of an
innovation instead of its development. This refers to a focus on technological dif-
fusion. To see whether this a⁄ects growth di⁄erently to direct payments to R&D,
we analyze the case in which the government subsidizes the technologically leading
vintage in manufacturing ￿max
t . For this purpose, the state budget covers a fraction
￿ of the price that vintage ￿max
t has to pay to the R&D sector. As a consequence,
demand and price of the intermediate good change to x￿max
t = ￿2=[￿! + (1 ￿ ￿)c]
and p￿max
t = [(1=￿) ￿ 1][￿=(1 ￿ ￿)]w￿ + (c￿=￿) according to the demand function
of the manufacturing ￿rm and the consequent price setting of the R&D unit (see
section 2.1.3). However, the demand does not change if there are skill shortages. In
this case the use of intermediate goods x￿max
t is a ￿xed proportion of the labor input
in ￿max
t which is restricted to the supply of skilled labor D. Otherwise, demand
and producer price increase with the introduction of subsidies. Both e⁄ects raise
pro￿ts of the innovator in R&D. It follows that the R&D sector attracts a higher
share of labor. Moreover, the costs of the intermediate good for vintage ￿max
t are
only (1 ￿ ￿)p￿max
t and, although the price is higher, the actual costs are below the26
level without subsidies. Remember that vintages other than ￿max
t do not demand the
technology update and, therefore, their costs remain the same as before. This means
that subsidies cause a relative cost advantage of vintage ￿max
t , which consequently
increases its contribution to total manufacturing output. This leads to a higher
share of workers employed in ￿max
t . Let 1=(1 + e ￿) denote the new raised share, with
e ￿ < ￿. Again, subsidies should be ￿nanced though a lump-sum tax, which must be
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if D < LM;￿max
t :
(32)
As 1 + e ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ in the denominator of AE·· get smaller the more subsidies are
paid, we can conclude that the number of researchers LR increases, such as in the
case of direct subsidies to R&D. Consequently, the frictionless regime (I) implies a
positive e⁄ect on growth but subsidies tend to reduce employment and growth in
regime (III), in which job destruction increases further as a result of skill shortages.
However, subsidies to manufacturing additionally a⁄ect job creation according
to EE. We know that subsidies to vintage ￿max
t increase its labor share compared to
other manufacturing vintages. This e⁄ect works against the shortage of skilled labor
if skill formation is particular high in the current technologically leading vintage.
On this condition more workers acquire skills and can be employed in the next ￿max
t .
Some of the restriction to job creation disappears. The EE-curve shifts and more
job creation implies higher employment and more researchers, which opposes the
e⁄ect from AE. In the end, more workers in R&D and in ￿max
t due to subsidies
increase both job destruction and job creation. Hence, the total e⁄ect on growth
and employment is not clearly cut in regime (III).
Table 1 summarizes the e⁄ects of knowledge formation. In contrast to the stan-
dard innovation models, the reallocation of resources from manufacturing to R&D
can result in a decline in employment and less growth if technology formation in-
creases relative to skill formation. We see the use of technologies as a process
of learning-by-using. Hence, the use of technologies improves the supply of skills,
whereas the development of innovations permanently demands new skills. In case
of skill shortages, subsidizing the use instead of the development of technologies27
Table 1: The e⁄ects of knowledge formation
AE EE Full employment Skill shortages
growth growth employment
Increase in " a 0 + ￿ -
Increase in ￿;￿ 0/a* a 0 ￿ ￿
Subsidies to R&D a 0 + - -
Subsidies to manufacturing a a + ￿ ￿
* ￿ a ￿in case of skill shortages, ￿ 0 ￿otherwise
a = above the initial locus, + = increase, - = decrease, ￿= ambiguous e⁄ect, 0 = no e⁄ect;
provides superior results in terms of employment and growth. While the model con-
￿rms the standard results of positive e⁄ects on growth from knowledge formation in
the full employment case, the outcome is much more ambiguous if we consider skill
shortages under the assumption of a technology-skill complementarity.17
4 Conclusion
We have presented a two-sector model of growth with knowledge formation and
continuous reallocation of labor. Technology updates and skill upgrades were the
two dimensions of knowledge formation. To what extent labor is reallocated depends
on the ratio of technology formation to skill formation. Frictions in terms of skill
shortages restrict the reallocation and lead to unemployment as a consequence of
technological change.
We can interpret the occurrence of unemployment due to technology formation
along the lines of the Neo-Schumpetrian literature on growth which explains the
emergence of new technologies and their obsolescence over time. New technologies
create new jobs but their obsolescence leads to job destruction as backward tech-
nologies are associated with less labor demand. Hence, we take into account that
labor has to be reallocated from old employments to new ones in a growing econ-
omy with technological change. The considered restriction in the reallocation is that
workers can be non-skilled in old jobs but they have to be skilled in the new ones
17This outcome matches the contradictory empirical results concerning the e⁄ect of growth on unem-
ployment. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), for example, ￿nd that growth reduces unemployment,
whereas the results by Tronti and Tanda (1998) and by Caballero (1993) give evidence for the
opposite e⁄ect.28
connected to the leading technologies. In case of skill shortages, ￿rms have di¢ cul-
ties in ￿nding the skilled workers who can ￿ll all new vacancies, and some of the
unemployed cannot ￿nd jobs for which non-skilled labor is su¢ cient. In our model,
unemployment is a side-e⁄ect of growth as technological change is the cause of the
reallocation of labor. This implies that innovation-based growth is a misleading
strategy to ￿ght unemployment as joblessness results from a skill shortage caused
by too many innovations. However, the economy grows without negative e⁄ects on
the labor market as long as the skill formation is high enough.
The analysis of how changes in knowledge formation a⁄ect growth yields mixed
results. Only in scenarios with an abundance of skilled workers we obtained the
result that more innovations unambiguously lead to more growth. Otherwise, the
relative lack of skilled labor is a limitation to the technology implementation of
the industries which produce the consumption goods. However, the restricted use
of technologies is just as an obstacle to growth as the restricted development of
innovations.
Appendix
The employment share of vintage ￿max
t :

















The sum of labor demand over vintages from the one with minimum technology to
￿max













Labor demand of the technologically leading vintage ￿max
t is given by (12). Let ￿

















































































if D < LM;￿max
t , and ￿ = 1
"(1+￿) if LM;￿max
t < D:
Hence, EE is strictly convex.30
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